Defamation, Privacy and the First Amendment by Steinberg, Robert A.
NOTE
DEFAMATION, PRIVACY AND THE
FIRST AMENDMENT
For the past dozen years, the Supreme Court has sought to recon-
cile the interests of state libel laws with the values of the first amend-
ment.1 The balance has been a delicate one, for "libel remains prem-
ised on the content of speech and limits the freedom of the publisher
to express certain sentiments ... ."' In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,3
the Court attempted to achieve this balance by eliminating the doctrine
of strict liability in defamation cases4 and by imposing a requirement
that actual injuries be separately alleged and proved as a predicate to
the recovery of damages.,5 Because these holdings substantially modi-
fied the common law of defamation, 6 it was not immediately clear how
the changes were to be applied.1
THE FOLLOWING CITATIONS WILL BE USED IN THIS NOTE:
1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS (1956) [hereinafter cited as F.
HARPER & F. JAMES);
M. NEWELL, THE LAW OF LIBEL AND SLANDER (2d ed. 1898) [hereinafter cited as
M. NEWELL];
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as
W. PROSSER];
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT];
Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L REv. 193 (1890) [hereinafter
cited as Warren & Brandeis].
1. See note 14 infra and text accompanying notes 41-48 infra. The seminal case
in this area is New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
2. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 152 (1967) (opinion of Harlan,
J., announcing the judgment of the Court).
3. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
4. Id. at 347. See notes 50-52 infra and accompanying text.
5. 418 U.S. at 349. See text accompanying notes 53-62 infra.
6. The common law presumed harm to reputation and mental comfort from the
mere utterance of a defamatory falsehood. See note 30 infra and text accompanying
notes 28-31 infra. A publisher of a defamatory falsehood was held strictly liable for
the consequences of his act. See note 50 infra. The Court's holdings in Gertz, there-
fore, significantly altered the common law. Mr. Justice White found this action disturb-
ing: "[Yielding to the apparently irresistible impulse to announce a new and different
interpretation of the First Amendment, the Court discards history and precedent in its
rush to refashion defamation law in accordance with the inclinations of a perhaps
evanescent majority of the Justices." 418 U.S. at 380 (White, J., dissenting).
7. Several commentators have endeavored to make predictions concerning the fu-
ture course of defamation law after Gertz. See, e.g., Anderson, Libel and Press Self-
Censorship, 53 TExAs L. REV. 422 (1975); Eaton, The American Law of Defamation
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The Court's most recent decision in this area clarifies some of
the ambiguities of Gertz," but also raises the new problem of whether
the Gertz rationale will be extended beyond defamation. In Time, Inc.
v. Firestone,' the Court permitted recovery for defamation solely on
the basis of mental pain and anguish; no injury to reputation was alleged
or proved."0 While this ruling comports with the common law's formula
f-or damages in defamation actions," it also suggests that the constitu-
tional distinctions between defamation and the tort of invasion of
privacy may in the future be ignored.' -
Until Firestone, the two torts differed greatly with respect to the
constitutional protection afforded defendants. In Time, Inc. V. Hill,'3
the Court held that plaintiffs must prove "actual malice" on the part
of defendants, that is, knowledge that a statement was false or reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not,' 4 in order to recover on claims
Through Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and Beyond: An Analytical Primer, 61 VA. L.
REV. 1349 (1975); Robertson, Defamation and the First Amendment: In Praise of
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 54 TEXAS L. REV. 199 (1976); Wade, Defamation, The
First Amendment and the Torts Restatement, 11 FORUM 3 (1975). Moreover, the Re-
statement of Torts has expressed more than the usual number of caveats in this area,
thus indicating the present unsettled state of defamation law. See Wade, supra, at 7.
8. Gertz left unclear both the actual damages question (which was addressed in
Firestone, see notes 60-62 infra and accompanying text) and how far the Court's elimi-
nation of strict liability would extend. Strict liability traditionally appeared in defama-
tion cases in five different contexts, and commentators have not agreed on whether
Gertz should be applied in each one. See note 51 infra and authorities cited therein.
9. 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
10. Id. at 460. See notes 60-62 infra and accompanying text.
11. At common law, defamation was defined in terms of the mere "tendency" of
the words to injure reputation. Once it was established that the words had such a
tendency, damages were presumed from the mere utterance of the statement, regardless
of whether any actual injuries in fact resulted. See text accompanying notes 26-31 infra.
12. As for the common law distinctions between these torts, see text accompanying
notes 26-40, 66-81 infra.
13. 385 U.S. 374 (1967). The case involved a magazine article reporting the open-
ing of a new play based on the actual experiences of a family held captive by three es-
caped convicts. The play dealt with this subject matter in a "fictionalized" manner, but
the article allegedly failed to distinguish between fiction and fact. The Supreme Court
held that the actual malice standard should apply in all false light privacy cases where
the reports involved "matters of public interest." id. at 387-88. The Court cautioned,
however, that
[t]his is [not] a libel action by a private individual . . . . Were this a libel
action, the distinction which has been suggested between the relative oppor-
tunities of the public official and the private individual to rebut defamatory
falsehoods might be germane. And the additional state interest in the protec-
tion of the individual against damage to his reputation would be involved.
Id. at 390-91.
14. This "actual malice" standard was first established by the Court in New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), the seminal case in the trend toward the
"constitutionalization" of common law defamation. The Court recognized "[t]hat er-
roneous statement is inevitable in free debate, and that it must be protected if the free-
doms of expression are to have the 'breathing space' that they 'need . . . to survive.'"
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of false light privacy.15  This holding applies in all cases where the
false reports concern "matters of public interest,"'16 and no distinction
is made between so-called "public" and "private" figures. In fact, the
Court explicitly ruled this distinction to be irrelevant in cases of pri-
vacy.1 7
In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,' however, this distinction was
central to the Court's ruling. In defamation cases where plaintiff is
a public figure,19 the Court stated that plaintiff is constitutionally re-
quired to show that the defendant acted with actual malice.20 Where
plaintiff is a private individual, any showing of fault greater than strict
liability is sufficient to overcome the initial constitutional barrier.2 1
Id. at 271-72. Consequently, a constitutional privilege was afforded defendants who ut-
tered defamatory falsehoods about "public officials" in relation to their "official con-
duct." Id. at 279-80. It was held that a public official must prove that the defamatory
statement was made "with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not" in order to recover. Id. This privilege was intended to
erect a subjective standard, measured by whether "the defendant in fact entertained seri-
ous doubts as to the truth of his publication." St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727,
731 (1968) (emphasis added).
The Court expanded this privilege to cases of false light privacy in Time, Inc. v.
Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967), and gradually broadened its application in cases of defama-
tion. In the companion cases of Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts and Associated Press
v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130 (1967), the Court held the actual malice standard applicable
in cases where the action is brought by one labeled as a "public figure." See note 122
infra for a discussion of the public figure designation. Finally, in Rosenbloom v. Metro-
media, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971), a plurality of the Court stretched constitutional protec-
tion to its limits and extended it "to all discussion and communication involving matters
of public or general concern, without regard to whether the persons involved are famous
or anonymous." Id. at 44. Since the Gertz opinion was issued in response to Rosen-
bloom's perceived abridgement of the state interest in protecting reputation, 418 U.S. at
346, it effectively overruled Rosenbloom. See Anderson, supra note 7, at 445.
15. For a discussion of the tort of false light privacy, see notes 32-34 infra and ac-
companying text.
16. 385 U.S. at 387-88.
17. Id. at 391.
18. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
19. "Public figures" are those persons who have "assumed roles of especial promi-
nence in the affairs of society." Id. at 345. The Court recognized that it might be
possible for one to become a public figure involuntarily, but "[mI]ore commonly, those
classed as public figures have thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public con-
troversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved." Id. See text ac-
companying notes 121-25 infra.
20. 418 U.S. at 342-43. In the companion cases of Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts
and Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130 (1967), the Court had extended the con-
stitutional privilege to public figures, and Gertz left that conclusion intact. See note
122 infra.
21. 418 U.S. at 347-48. The Court did not say what standard of proof would be
required of private plaintiffs but only that "so long as they do not impose liability with-
out fault, the States may define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for
a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual." Id.
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Thus, private plaintiffs have a higher constitutional obstacle to sur-
mount in cases of false light privacy than in cases of defamation.
In light of the Court's recognition of the interrelationship between
defamation and privacy, 2- Gertz has been viewed as a threat to the
continued validity of Hill as it relates to private figures.2 3  Firestone
enlarges this threat by allowing recovery in the absence of any claim
of injury to reputation. While Firestone is nominally a defamation ac-
tion, the only injuries for which recovery was sought involve interests
normally vindicated in privacy actions.2 4 Consequently, the Court's
holding suggests that the Gertz principles may be extended into the
privacy area: if a plaintiff can recover for mental injuries on a showing
of negligence when a false statement is defamatory, it seems to follow
that the same standard should govern where similar injuries result from
a non-defamatory statement.25
This Note examines the torts of defamation and privacy in an ef-
fort to determine the wisdom of such an extension in view of the values
of free speech. It concludes that adequate protection of first amend-
ment freedoms requires retention of the actual malice standard in all
invasion of privacy actions irrespective of the defamatory character of
the statement or of whether a public or private figure brings the action.
Since negligence is the law's least stringent standard of liability based on fault, the Court
was presumably permitting the states to allow recovery on this basis. Several of the
states have in fact done so. See Troman v. Wood, 62 Ill. 2d 184, 340 N.E.2d 292
(1975); Gobin v. Globe Publishing Co., 216 Kan. 223, 531 P.2d 76 (1975); Wilson v.
Capital City Press, 315 So. 2d 393 (La. App. 1975); Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Lascola,
31 Md. App. 153, 355 A.2d 757 (1976); Stone v. Essex County Newspapers, Inc., -
Mass. -, 330 N.E.2d 161 (1975); Thomas H. Maloney & Sons v. E.W. Scripps Co., 43
Ohio App. 2d 105, 334 N.E.2d 494 (1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 883 (1975); Martin
v. Griffin Television, Inc., 549 P.2d 85 (Okla. 1976). Other states, however, have re-
tained the "actual malice" standard established by previous Supreme Court cases. See
Walker v. Colorado Springs Sun, Inc., - Colo. -, 538 P.2d 450 (1975); Aafco Heating
and Air Conditioning Co. v. Northwest Publishing Co., - Ind. App. -, 321 N.E.2d 580
(1974); Safarets, Inc. v. Gannett Co., 80 Misc. 2d 109, 361 N.Y.S.2d 276 (Sup. Ct.
1974).
22. The rationale for the Court's decision in Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374
(1967), was derived from the defamation cases it had already decided. See id. at 388-
90. The Court did caution, however, that "although the First Amendment principles
pronounced in New York Times guide our conclusion, we reach that conclusion only
by applying these principles in this discrete context." Id. at 390-91.
23. See RESTATEMENT § 652E, comment d, at 35 (Tent. Draft No. 22, 1976).
See also Wade, supra note 7, at 13-14. In Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419
U.S. 245, 250-51 (1974), decided shortly after Gertz, the Court expressly left this issue
open.
24. See note 32 infra.
25. Cf. W. PROssER § 117, at 817-18 (privileges which apply in defamation should
also apply in cases of privacy); Warren & Brandeis at 216-17.
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Accordingly, the Court will be faced with a dilemma when it considers
a privacy action brought by a non-public figure: Firestone must either
be distinguished or limited. It is contended here that the second alter-
native is the more feasible solution.
The Note will begin by discussing the way in which the Supreme
Court's recent decisions have altered the common law of defamation
and privacy to take fuller account of the public's interest in free speech.
It will then analyze more closely the various interests protected by def-
amation and privacy actions in order to determine whether the Court's
potential merger of these two torts would adequately accommodate
those interests. That section will also examine the common law's gen-
eral approach to damages for mental injuries and will consider defama-
tion and privacy in this context. Finally, the Note will discuss the
effect of Firestone on privacy law and evaluate the alternative ap-
proaches the Court might take in future cases.
I. COMPENSABLE INJURIES AND DAMAGES
A. Common Law
Defamation actions have traditionally been viewed as redressing
an individual's interest in his good name and reputation. 6 A commu-
nication was defamatory at common law "if it tend[ed] so to harm
the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the com-
munity or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with
him." 27 As this definition makes evident, it was unnecessary to show
26. See F. HARPER & F. JAMES § 5.1; W. PROSSER § 111; RESTATEMENT § 559
(Tent. Draft No. 20, 1974). Courts have often permitted recovery for injury in the
form of mental suffering as well, but have considered the mental injury to be ancillary
to the damage to reputation. See, e.g., Fuqua Television, Inc. v. Fleming, 134 Ga. App.
731, 215 S.E.2d 694 (1975); McMullen v. Corkum, 143 Me. 47, 54 A.2d 753 (1947);
Farrar v. Tribune Publishing Co., 57 Wash. 2d 549, 358 P.2d 792 (1961). But see
Kelly v. Loew's, Inc., 76 F. Supp. 473 (D. Mass. 1948). See generally RESTATEMENT
§ 623 (Tent. Draft No. 20, 1974); Day, Mental Suffering as an Element of Damages
in Defamation Cases, 15 CLEV.-MAR. L. REv. 26 (1966). See notes 88-89 infra and
accompanying text.
27. RESTATEMENT § 559 (Tent. Draft No. 20, 1974). See also Bordoni v. New
York Times Co., 400 F. Supp. 1223 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Gregory v. McDonnell Douglas
Corp., 55 Cal. App. 3d 605, 127 Cal. Rptr. 825 (1976); Corabi v. Curtis Publishing
Co., 441 Pa. 432, 273 A.2d 899 (1971). Prosser defines defamation as
that which tends to injure "reputation" in the popular sense; to diminish the
esteem, respect, goodwill or confidence in which the plaintiff is held, or to
excite adverse, derogatory or unpleasant feelings or opinions against him. It
necessarily, however, involves the idea of disgrace. W. PROSSER § 111, at 739.
Liability cannot be imposed in a defamation action unless reputation is harmed in the
eyes of a substantial number of persons in the community. See, e.g., Peck v. Tribune
Co., 214 U.S. 185 (1909); Oberman v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 460 F.2d 1381 (7th Cir.
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actual harm to reputation in order for the communication to be defama-
tory."' Once the defamatory character of the words was established,2 9
general damages were presumed as a result of the natural tendency
of the words to do harm to reputation.30 These general damages in-
1972); Baird v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 446 Pa. 266, 285 A.2d 166 (1971). See also
W. PROSSER § 111, at 743-44; RESTATEMENT § 559, comment e at 8 (Tent. Draft No.
20, 1974). It is unnecessary, however, that most members of the community should
have a lesser regard for the victim: "Liability is not a question of a majority vote."
Peck v. Tribune Co., 214 U.S. at 190 (Holmes, J.).
28. See, e.g., Corabi v. Curtis Publishing Co., 441 Pa. 432, 273 A.2d 899 (1971).
At common law, the difficulty of proving injury to reputation was obviated by the doc-
trine which presumed damages from the mere utterance of the defamatory falsehood.
See note 30 infra. Evidence that no actual damage was suffered was admissible only
to mitigate the amount of damages recovered. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. N.R. McFall
& Co., 144 Ark. 149, 222 S.W. 40 (1920).
29. Words may be defamatory on their face, or extrinsic facts may be necessary to
make out the defamatory meaning. Where words were defamatory on their face, the
action was sometimes known as defamation per se. At common law, this phrase also
referred to actions in which there was no requirement to plead "special damage," see note
31 infra, in order to maintain the action. These meanings were often confused with one
another. For a brief discussion of this problem, see W. PROSSER § 112, at 763-64. The
American Law Institute has adopted the latter definition throughout the Restatement,
see RESTATEMENT § 569, comment b at 55-56 (Tent. Draft No. 20, 1974), and this Note
will do the same.
As a general rule, imputations that the plaintiff had committed a crime or was af-
flicted with a "loathesome" disease, words that defamed a person in his business, trade,
profession or office, and imputations of unchastity were all actionable per se in cases
of slander. See, e.g., Munafo v. Helfland, 140 F. Supp. 234 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) ("a known
criminal"); Le Moine v. Spicer, 146 Fla. 758, 1 So. 2d 730 (1941) (habitual drunken-
ness); Barry v. Baugh, 111 Ga. App. 813, 143 S.E.2d 489 (1965) ("crazy"); Cobb v.
Tinsely, 195 Ky. 781, 243 S.W. 1009 (1922) (bed wetting); Foley v. Hoffman, 188 Md.
273, 52 A.2d 476 (1947) (accusation of incapacity for office); Gnapinsky v. Goldyn,
23 N.J. 243, 128 A.2d 697 (1952) (imputation of unchastity). See generally F. HARPER
& F. JAMES § 5.10-.13; M. NEWELL at 93-100; W. PROSSER § 112, at 754-60 and cases
cited therein; RESTATEMENT § 570-74 and cases cited therein. Libel was always action-
able per se when the words were defamatory on their face. See, e.g., Couper v. Vannier,
20 Ill. App. 499, 156 N.E.2d 761 (1959) (charge of "mental illness"); Brauer v. Globe
Newspaper Co., 351 Mass. 53, 217 N.E.2d 736 (1966) ("mentally retarded"). Until
recently, however, the majority of American courts have held that when extrinsic facts
are necessary to make out the defamatory meaning of the statement, special damages
must also be proved in order to maintain the action, unless the statement falls into one
of the exceptional categories of slander. See, e.g., cases cited in W. PROSSER § 112, at
763 nn.32-33. See generally Prosser, Libel Per Quod, 46 VA. L. REv. 839 (1960). The
recent trend of the law, however, has been to hold all libel actionable per se. See, e.g.,
Hinsdale v. Orange County Publishers, 17 N.Y.2d 284, 217 N.E.2d 650 (1966); Hinkle
v. Alexander, 244 Ore. 267, 417 P.2d 586 (1966); Pitts v. Spokane Chronicle Co., 63
Wash. 2d 763, 388 P.2d 976 (1964); Martin v. Outboard Marine Corp., 15 Wisc. 2d
452, 113 N.W.2d 135 (1962). See also RESTATEMENT § 569 (Tent. Draft No. 20,
1974).
30. The basis for the common law doctrine of presumed damages is that
[a]ctual damage to reputation may be suffered [but] the plaintiff may be
unable to prove it. By the very nature of the harm resulting from defamatory
publications, it is frequently not susceptible of objective proof. Libel and
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cluded compensation for injury to reputation as well as for any mental
suffering which resulted from the defamation.3
Recovery for invasion of privacy, by contrast, redresses an indi-
vidual directly for injuries to his sensibilities resulting from unwar-
ranted intrusions or publicity.3 2  When the publicity includes inaccu-
slander work their evil in ways that are invidious and subtle. The door of
opportunity may be closed to the victim without his knowledge, his business
or professional career limited by the operation of forces which he cannot
identify but which, nonetheless, were set in motion by the defamatory state-
ments.
F. HARPER & F. JAMES § 5.30. See also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,
392-95 (1974) (White, J., dissenting). An additional problem is that "the only
witnesses able to establish the necessary causal connection [between harm resulting
from injury to reputation and the defamatory utterance] may be reluctant to testify
that the publication affected their relationships with the plaintiffs." Note, Develop-
ments in the Law-Defamation, 69 HARV. L. REv. 875, 891-92 (1956). Thus, the com-
mon law presumed damages from the mere utterance of the defamatory falsehood, and
publishers of the defamation were held strictly liable for their conduct regardless of
whether or not they might have reasonably known or expected the statement to be de-
famatory. See note 50 infra.
Several factors were considered by the jury in assessing presumed damages. These
included the area of dissemination, the previous reputation of the plaintiff, whether and
in what spirit a retraction was issued by the defendant, and evidence of aversion, con-
tempt or social ostracism. See F. HARPER & F. JAMES § 5.30.
31. "General damages are those which the law will presume to be the natural or
probable consequences of the defamatory words. ... M. NEWELL at 838. Thus, gen-
eral damages are intended to compensate the plaintiff for the injury done to his reputa-
tion and for any mental distress he may have suffered. See id. at 841; RESTATEMENT
§ 621, comment a at 78-79 (Tent. Draft No. 21, 1975). They are to be distinguished
from special damages.
Special damages compensate for injuries which are not inferred from the nature
of the words themselves, but must be specifically alleged and proved. See M. NEWELL
at 849; W. PROSSER § 112, at 760. Furthermore, they must be derived from the loss of
an asset of measurable value. See F. HARPER & F. JAMES § 5.30; M. NEWELL at 851,
856-57; W. PROSSER § 112, at 760-61. Thus, a difficulty arises for plaintiff because
certain defamation actions are maintainable only if special damages are proved. See note
29 supra. Moreover, the law has consistently refused to recognize mental suffering as a
special damage sufficient to confer a right of action. See, e.g., Clark v. Morrison, 80
Ore. 240, 156 P. 429 (1916). See generally Day, supra note 26. Compensation for
mental suffering may be included as an element of general damages, however, once the
cause of action is established. F. HARPER & F. JAMES § 5.30; W. PROSSER § 112, at 761.
32. See text accompanying notes 70-78 infra. Modern jurisprudence has identified
four torts under the rubric of invasion of privacy: "unreasonable intrusion upon the se-
clusion of another," see RESTATEMENT § 652B (Tent. Draft No. 22, 1976); "appropria-
tion of the other's name or likeness," see id. § 652C; "unreasonable publicity given to
the other's private life," see id. § 652D; and "publicity which unreasonably places the
other in a false light before the public," see id. § 652E.
The first category of privacy involves intentional interference with an individual's
interest in seclusion or solitude, whether the intrusion be by physical means or otherwise.
See, e.g., Walker V. Whittle, 83 Ga. App. 445, 64 S.E.2d 87 (1951) (entry without legal
authority to make arrest); Souder v. Pendleton Detectives, 88 So. 2d 716 (La. App.
1956) (spying into windows); Welsh v. Pritchard, 125 Mont. 517, 241 P.2d 816 (1952)
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rate statements of fact, the tort is known as "false light" invasion of
privacy, that is, publicity which displays the individual other than as
he actually is.33 It is this branch of privacy which most closely resembles
(landlord moving in on tenant); Sutherland v. Kroger Co., 110 S.E.2d 716 (W. Va.
1959) (illegal search of woman's shopping bag in store). See also RESTATEMENT
§ 652B (Tent. Draft No. 22, 1976). The action has clear elements of trespass. See
Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389-90 (1960).
The second category, appropriation, involves what has become known as the "right
of publicity," that is, the right of one to exploit commercially his own name or likeness
and to seek compensation from anyone else who attempts to exploit them. See, e.g.,
Haelan Labs, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
346 U.S. 816 (1953); Pallas v. Crowley, Milner & Co., 322 Mich. 411, 33 N.W.2d 911
(1948). See generally RESTATEMENT § 652C (Tent. Draft No. 22, 1976); Prosser, Pri-
vacy, supra, at 401-07. One commentator has suggested that the right is a separately
cognizable legal interest and that privacy actions inadequately vindicate this interest.
Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAw & CONTEMP. PRoB. 203 (1954).
The third category, publicity given to private life, is the form most commonly iden-
tified with the right of privacy. The earliest supporters of a right to privacy contem-
plated that this form, together with false light privacy, infra, would operate as the pri-
mary means of protection. See Warren & Brandeis. In order to succeed in his suit,
a plaintiff must prove that the publicized facts would be offensive or objectionable to
a reasonable man of ordinary sensibilities. See, e.g., Gill v. Hearst Publishing Co., 40
Cal. 2d 224, 253 P.2d 441 (1953); Meetze v. Associated Press, 230 S.C. 330, 95 S.E.2d
606 (1956). See generally RESTATEMENT § 652D, comment c at 23-24 (Tent. Draft
No. 22, 1976). During most of the twentieth century, however, this third category
has been successfully employed in very few cases, primarily because of increasing
judicial recognition of a "newsworthiness" privilege. See note 77 infra. It has been
suggested that only privacy protected by the Constitution-for example, the privacy of
one's sexual habits or marital behavior, see, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)
(woman's private right to decide whether to continue pregnancy); Griswold v. Connecti-
cut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (married couple's private right to decide to use contracep-
tives)-should be protected by this third form of privacy action. See T. EMERSON, THE
SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 555-57 (1970). See also Wade, supra note 7, at
14.
The final category of privacy, known as false light privacy, involves injuries result-
ing from publicity which places one in a "false light" in the public eye by conveying
erroneous or misleading information about the individual. See note 33 infra and cases
cited therein. This tort has also been described as "nondefamatory falsehood," see Pem-
ber & Teeter, Privacy and the Press Since Time, Inc. v. Hill, 50 WASH. L. REv. 57, 83-
87 (1974), because its sole distinction from defamation is that the false or misleading
publicity has no tendency to injure reputation. The falsehood very often proves to be
defamatory, however, in which case both actions will lie. See, e.g., W. PROSSER § 117, at
813 n.19 and cases cited therein. See also RESTATEMENT § 652E, comment b at 31-32
(Tent. Draft No. 22, 1976). Because of their great similarity, it has been suggested
that defamation and false light privacy should be condensed into a single tort. See W.
PROSSER § 117, at 813-14; Wade, Defamation and the Right of Privacy, 15 VAND. L.
REV. 1093 (1962). Contrast the argument made in the text accompanying notes 126-37
infra. It should be noted that this division of the right of privacy into four separate
groupings has not met with universal approval. See, e.g., Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law-
Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAw & CONTEMP. PRoB. 326, 332-33 (1966);
Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39
N.Y.U. L. REV. 962 (1964).
33. See, e.g., Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245 (1974) (inaccu-
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defamation, since both are predicated upon false statements of fact.34
Invasion of privacy is a recent invention of the common law. 5
The action as originally conceived was designed to provide redress for
"wounded feelings" resulting from publicity given to private affairs.3 6
To the extent that both privacy and defamation actions are intended
to compensate plaintiffs for mental disturbance, the two torts overlap.37
Nevertheless, they are not entirely interchangeable. A statement can
be defamatory but not concern private affairs. Conversely, publicity
may be given to private affairs yet include no defamatory statements.
rate report of family's life style after death of father); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374
(1967) (article misstating facts of family's encounter with escaped criminals); Varnish
v. Best Medium Publishing Co., 405 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S.
987 (1969) (false account that suicide victim's life was "happy"); Steding v. Battistoni,
3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 76, 208 A.2d 559 (1964) (filing suit in plaintiff's name without au-
thorization); Hinish v. Meier & Frank Co., 166 Ore. 482, 113 P.2d 438 (1941) (impos-
turous use of telegram to governor urging him to veto bill). See generally W. PROSSER
§ 117, at 812-14; RESTATEMENT § 652E (Tent. Draft No. 22, 1976); Prosser, supra note
32, at 398-401. For the purposes of this Note, whenever "privacy" is used, the reference
will be to "false light" privacy, unless the context clearly shows otherwise.
34. It has been questioned "whether this branch of the tort is not capable of swal-
lowing up and engulfing the whole law of defamation; and whether there is any false
libel printed, for example, in a newspaper, which cannot be redressed upon the alterna-
tive ground." W. PROSSER § 117, at 813. This argument has also been made by Dean
Prosser's successor as Reporter to the Restatement of Torts. See Wade, supra note 32.
While the resemblance between the torts is admittedly great, significant differences
do exist. For example, defamation requires that there be a "publication," a term of art
which includes private communication, while privacy requires public communication.
See RESTATEMENT § 652D, comment a, at 21 (Tent. Draft No. 22, 1976). Most actions
in slander, that is, oral defamation, see W. PROSSER § 112, at 752-62, would therefore
probably not be actionable as false light privacy. Moreover, the Supreme Court presently
recognizes a higher level of constitutional protection for the media in privacy cases than
in defamation cases. See text accompanying notes 13-21 supra. Finally, theoretical
considerations implicit in tort law also provide reasons for separate treatment of the
torts. See text accompanying notes 126-43 infra.
35. See text accompanying notes 70-78 infra. The first case that explicitly recog-
nized a right of privacy was decided in 1890 and was followed by a series of other lower
court decisions. See discussion in W. PRossER § 117, at 803 n.10. Pavesich v. New
England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905) (use of plaintiff's unauthorized
picture with spurious testimonial), was the first case in which a court of last resort ac-
cepted the existence of the right. See generally W. PROSSER § 117, at 802-04.
36. Warren and Brandeis recognized that "a legal remedy for such injury seems to
involve the treatment of mere wounded feelings, as a substantive cause of action." War-
ren and Brandeis at 197. They were aware, however, that recovery for wounded feelings
had to be attendant to a violation of a recognized legal right before it would be per-
mitted. Id. at 197-98. Thus, they devoted their article to proving the existence of the
right to privacy, see notes 70-78 infra and accompanying text, and concluded that the
remedy for violation of this right would be an action in tort for damages: "Even in
the absence of special damages, substantial compensation could be allowed for injury to
feelings. . . ." Id. at 219.
37. See note 34 supra.
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It is only in cases where the unwanted publicity is also defamatory that
either action will lie. 8
If an action were maintainable on the basis of both defamation
and privacy, it made little difference which was actually asserted."" Be-
cause general damages in defamation actions were presumed, the com-
mon law saw no need to differentiate between injury to reputation and
injury to mental comfort..40  Thus, the interests protected by both
torts received adequate vindication in an action brought for defamation.
B. Supreme Court Modifications
In recent years, the Supreme Court has recognized that common
law privileges4 are inadequate to preserve the public's interest in free
38. See, e.g., W. PROSSER § 117, at 813 n.19 and cases cited therein. The American
Law Institute also supports this position. See RESTATEMENT § 652E, comment b at 31
(Tent. Draft No. 22, 1976).
39. This statement is generally true, but there are some differences involved in
bringing one action or the other. For example, there is no need to prove special dam-
ages in the case of privacy, and different results obtain with respect to the applicable
statute of limitations and survival of the action. See W. PROSSER § 117, at 814 and Cases
cited therein.
40. For example, in one case the judge instructed the jury that "the appropriate
measure of damages [in a libel suit] is the loss of reputation suffered by the plaintiff,
the physical pain which he has suffered, and the mental anguish which he has suffered."
Curley v. Curtis Publishing Co., 48 F. Supp. 29, 34 (D. Mass. 1942) (Wyzanski, J.).
No attempt was made to distinguish among any of these bases for recovery, so it would
be unclear from the final award which injuries were in fact compensated for. After
Geriz, this type of instruction is no longer permissible.
41. The common law protects defendants with a number of absolute and qualified
privileges which are available depending upon the character of the defendant or upon
the circumstances of the defamation. Absolute privileges "are based chiefly upon a rec-
ognition of the necessity that certain persons, because of their special position or status,
shall be free as possible from fear that their actions in that position may have an ad-
verse effect upon their own personal interests." RESTATEMENT, Introductory Note
§§ 585-592A at 160 (Tent. Draft No. 20, 1974). Absolute immunity is extended to
all parties to a judicial proceeding, including the judge, attorneys, the disputants, wit-
nesses, and jurors, to all legislators, executive and administrative officers of the United
States and the superior executive officers of the respective states, and to a husband and
wife. See F. HARPER & F. JAMES § 5.22-.23; M. NEWELL at 418-75; W. PROSSER
§ 114 and cases cited therein. The continued validity of absolute immunity for fed-
eral executive and administrative officers and for state executive officers, however, is
questionable in light of the Supreme Court's holding in Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232
(1974), and the District of Columbia Circuit Court's decision in Apton v. Wilson, 506
F.2d 83 (D.C. Cir. 1974). It was held in Scheuer that state executive officers are pro-
tected by only a qualified immunity in actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and Ap-
ton extended the Scheuer rationale to such actions brought against federal executive offi-
cers. Although these cases were concerned with section 1983, their rationales might be
applicable to defamation actions as well. See Economou v. Department of Agriculture,
535 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1976).
A new absolute privilege has developed protecting those who are required by law
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to publish matter which may be defamatory. RESTATEMENT § 592A (Tent. Draft No.
20, 1974). This privilege was established by the Supreme Court with respect to radio
and television broadcasts under the Federal Communications Act. See Farmers Educ.
& Coop. Union v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525 (1959). Finally, it should be noted that
the absolute privilege created by the Supreme Court for federal officers in Barr v. Mat-
teo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959), was the basis for the Court's establishment of the actual
malice standard when public officials are plaintiffs. See New York Times Co. v. Sulli-
van, 376 U.S. 254, 282 (1964) ("Such a privilege for criticism of official conduct is
appropriately analogous to the protection accorded a public official when he is sued
for libel by a private citizen").
In addition to these absolute privileges, defendants are further insulated from lia-
bility in defamation actions by various absolute defenses. An absolute defense is avail-
able where the plaintiff has given his consent to the publication, see RESTATEMENT §
583 (Tent. Draft No. 20, 1974), or where the defamatory utterance is true, see W.
PROSSR § 116, at 796-99 and cases cited therein; RESTATEMENT § 582 (Tent. Draft No.
20, 1974). The question of truth as a defense has been a troublesome one for the Su-
preme Court. Some have thought that Gertz had settled the issue, reasoning that de-
fendant could not be at fault if the statement were true, see Cox Broadcasting Corp. v.
Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 497-500 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring); see also Wade, supra note
7, at 12, but the majority opinion in Cox expressly left this question open: "Rather than
address the broader question whether truthful publications may ever be subjected to civil
or criminal liability consistently with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, or to put
it another way, whether the State may ever define and protect an area of privacy free
from unwanted publicity in the press, it is appropriate to focus on the narrower interface
between press and privacy that this case presents . . . ." 420 U.S. at 491.
Qualified, or conditional, privileges are intended to "afford a protection based upon
a public policy which recognizes that it is essential that true information shall be given
whenever it is reasonably necessary for the protection of one's own interests, the inter-
ests of third persons, or certain interests of the public." RESTATEMENT, Scope Note
§§ 593-605A, at 188 (Tent. Draft No. 20, 1974). A qualified privilege is avail-
able where the publisher of the falsehood is seeking to protect any lawful, pecuniary in-
terest he possesses, see, e.g., RESTATEMENT § 594 (Tent. Draft No. 20, 1974) and cases
cited therein; where the publisher seeks to protect the interest of the recipient of the
information or of a third person, as, for example, where the publisher is a credit agency,
a hired investigator, or a person asked to provide information about a present or prospec-
tive employee of the recipient, see, e.g., id. § 595 and cases cited therein; where the pub-
lisher has a common interest with the recipient, for example, where they are both mem-
bers of a religious, fraternal or charitable organization, or where they have common
property or business and professional interests, see, e.g., id. § 596 and cases cited therein;
where the publisher acts to serve the well-being of a member of his immediate family,
see, e.g., id. § 597 and cases cited therein; where the communication is made to one
who may act in the public interest, see, e.g., id. § 598 and cases cited therein; and where
the publisher is an inferior state officer, see, e.g., id. § 598A and cases cited therein.
See also F. HARPER & F. JAMES §§ 5.25-.26; M. NEWELL at 475-563; W. PROSSER § 115,
at 785-92 and cases cited therein. Moreover, two other conditional privileges available at
common law, fair comment on matters of public concern and reports of public proceed-
ings, see F. HARPER & F. JAMES §§ 5.24, 5.26; M. NEWELL at 564-92; RESTATEMENT
§§ 606-12 (Tent. Draft No. 20, 1974), have become subsumed under the constitutional
privilege created by the Supreme Court, which is itself a qualified privilege that can be
defeated by a showing of actual malice. See W. PROSSER § 115, at 792.
Conditional privileges are unavailable to a defendant if he has abused the occasion
or steps outside the scope of his privilege. The privilege may be defeated because of
the publisher's lack of belief or reasonable grounds for belief in the truth of the defama-
tory matter; because the defamatory matter is published for some purpose other than that
for which the privilege is available; because the publication is made to some person not
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speech.42  Free speech has always been a "preferred freedom!' in
America43 and any inhibition of its exercise has been looked upon with
disfavor." It was for this reason that the Court initiated the process
of "constitutionalizing"'4 5 the common law of defamation and privacy.
The Court feared that defamation actions might be used as a vehicle
reasonably believed to be necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose of the privi-
lege; or because the publication includes defamatory matter not reasonably believed to
be necessary for the privilege's purpose. See F. HARPER & F. JAMES § 5.27; W. PROSSER
§ 115, at 792-96 and cases cited therein; RESTATEM NT §§ 599-605a (Tent. Draft No. 20,
1974) and cases cited therein.
42. Indeed, in the New York Times case, the Court expressly focused its inquiry
on state laws which included the common law privilege of "fair comment" and the de-
fense of truth. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 267-69 (1964).
43. In Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945), the Supreme Court noted that there
is a "preferred place given in our scheme to the great, the indispensable democratic free-
doms secured by the First Amendment. . . . That priority gives these liberties a sanc-
tity and a sanction not permitting dubious intrusions." Id. at 529-30. See also Beauhar-
nais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 285 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Dennis v. United
States, 341 U.S. 494, 581 (1951) (Black, J., dissenting); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S.
77, 88 (1949). But see id. at 90-96 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
The preferred position of the first amendment has also been discussed by many
commentators. See, e.g., McKay, The Preference for Freedom, 34 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1182,
1184 (1959) ("The central, the inescapable proposition to which this study is directed
is the notion that the freedom of expression is so vital in its relationship to the objec-
tives of the Constitution that inevitably it must stand in a preferred position.") See
also T. EMERSON, supra note 32; Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment
Problems, 47 INDIANA L.J. 1, 20-24 (1971). Judge Learned Hand stated that the first
amendment "presupposes that right conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of
a multitude of tongues, than through any kind of authoritative selection. To many this
is, and always will be, folly; but we have staked upon it our all." United States v. As-
sociated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943). The New York Times case was
decided "against the background of a profound national commitment to the principle that
debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open. . . ." New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964); cf. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323, 339-41 (1974).
44. Prior restraints upon the exercise of free speech have generally been struck
down, see, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Near v.
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); withholding of benefits from persons for exercising
their first amendment rights is generally prohibited, see, e.g., Keyishian v. Board of Re-
gents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967) (state plan requiring employees to sign statement that they
were not "Communists" as a condition for continued employment constitutionally imper-
missible); and even government action to prevent a person from advocating unlawful
conduct must be predicated upon a "clear and present danger" in order to be upheld,
see, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S.
357, 372 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
45. Cf. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 370 (1974) (White, J., dissent-
ing): "[Ulsing [the First] Amendment as the chosen instrument, the Court, in a few
printed pages, has federalized major aspects of libel laws by declaring unconstitutional
in important respects the prevailing defamation law in all or most of the 50 states." See
also Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 81 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing).
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to suppress unpopular opinion46 and that the threat of such actions
might induce publishers to exercise self-censorship to avoid the conse-
quences of an adverse verdict. To allay these fears, the Court in a
series of cases first erected and then expanded a constitutional priv-
ilege to protect defendants in most defamation actions.47  This priv-
ilege was designed to shield defendants from all liability except in those
instances where they had acted with actual malice.48
In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,49 the Court altered the coverage
of the constitutional privilege, and also modified the common law prin-
ciples regarding the element of damages in defamation actions. In
sum, the Court held that actual malice need not be proved unless the
plaintiff is a public figure. The Court found, however, that strict lia-
bility for defamatory utterances 0 would be inconsistent with the first
amendment,"' and substituted for the actual malice standard a minimal
46. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340, 349 (1974); New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964).
47. See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
48. See note 14 supra.
49. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). The petitioner in Gertz, a Chicago lawyer, had been en-
gaged to represent the family of a murder victim in a civil suit against the police officer
convicted of the crime. Respondent's publication, a national forum for the John Birch
Society, reported on the murder conviction and alleged that it had been engineered by
the petitioner as part of a nation-wide communist campaign to discredit the police. The
petitioner was labeled a "Leninist" and a "Communist-fronter" because of his purported
membership in several communist organizations. Respondent's editors had made no at-
tempt to verify these charges independently, and it was found that the statements "con-
tained serious inaccuracies." Id. at 326.
The Seventh Circuit, holding that the article concerned issues of significant public
interest, applied the New York Times standard and ruled that petitioner had failed to
show actual malice on the respondent's part. Id. at 330-32. Writing for the Court, Jus-
tice Powell focused on the finding that petitioner was not a public figure and refused
to apply the New York Times standard. The decision below was reversed and re-
manded. See id. at 332.
50. Previously, once it had been established that a statement was defamatory, it
made no difference that the defendant did not intend the statement to be defamatory
or that he was not otherwise negligent; he was held absolutely liable for the injury to
the other. The harshness of this rule was mitigated somewhat by permitting innocent
publication of the defamatory statement to a third party to go unpunished. Thus, if the
defendant did not intend and could not reasonably have anticipated that a third person
might hear or read the statement, there could be no liability for defamation. See W.
PROSSER § 113, at 772-76 and cases cited therein.
51. 418 U.S. at 347. The Court ruled that this stricture applies "[a]t least
where, as here, the substance of the defamatory statement 'makes substantial danger to
reputation apparent.'" Id. at 348, citing Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130,
155 (1967). It is unclear, however, with respect to what elements of a defamation ac-
tion fault is required to be shown. There are five contexts in which the question of
fault arises in a defamation action: (1) publication to a third party; (2) truth or falsity
of communication; (3) defamatory character of the communication; (4) content of the
communication; and (5) reference to plaintiff. See RESTATEMENT § 580B, comment b
at 27 (Tent. Draft No. 21, 1975); W. PRossER § 113, at 771. The common law has
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requirement that some fault on the part of the defendant be shown
by private plaintiffs. 52 The Court further tempered its apparent con-
striction of the publisher's constitutional privilege with a complemen-
tary ruling that presumed damages are no longer permissible.53
Unless the defendant published the statement with knowledge of its
falsity or in reckless disregard of its truth or falsity, recovery must be
limited to actual damages. 4 Finally, the Court stated that actual injury
"is not limited to out-of-pocket loss"; 55 the plaintiff may also recover
for "impairment of reputation and standing in the community, personal
humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering."5 6  All awards, how-
never imposed strict liability in the first context. See note 50 supra. The statement in
Gertz abandoning strict liability was apparently made with reference to the second con-
text. See RESTATEMENT §580B, comment c at 28 (Tent. Draft No. 21, 1975); Robert-
son, supra note 7, at 242-43. Furthermore, the statement quoted above, that the lower
standard of fault is required where the "substance of the defamatory statement 'makes
substantial danger to reputation apparent,"' can be seen as an indication that the negli-
gence standard is applicable in the third context as well. See RESTATEMENT § 580B,
comment c at 28 (Tent. Draft No. 21, 1975); Eaton, supra note 7, at 1427-28. It may
well be that the logic of the Court's holding and the policy which it implements requires
application of the negligence standard in all contexts. See RESTATEMENT § 580B, com-
ment c at 28-29 (Tent. Draft No. 21, 1975).
The response of the state courts to this problem is discussed in Anderson, supra
note 7, at 461-65. The author notes that most state courts which have faced the prob-
lem since Gertz have applied the negligence standard only in the context of the truth
or falsity of the statement. See note 21 supra and cases cited therein. Since Gertz ef-
fectively overruled Rosenbloom's application of the actual malice standard to all defama-
tion cases concerning matters of public interest, see note 14 supra, and since the actual
malice standard applies only with respect to the truth or falsity of the defamatory state-
ment, the approach taken by the state courts is not surprising.
52. 418 U.S. at 347. For a discussion of what the states have done with this man-
date, see note 21 supra.
53. 418 U.S. at 349-50.
54. If plaintiff could prove that defendant acted with actual malice, however, plain-
tiff could still recover punitive damages, and perhaps even presumed damages since the
Court did not exclude this possibility. See id. See also Anderson, supra note 7, at 473-
77.
55. 418 U.S. at 350. The Court was determined to avoid the appearance that its
actual damage requirement corresponded to the common law concept of special damages.
See, e.g., Eaton, supra note 7, at 1434-36; cf. Robertson, supra note 7, at 230-34. Spe-
cial damages have to be specifically alleged and proved in order to be recovered. See
note 31 supra. In this respect, they closely resemble the Gertz actual damages. In or-
der to maintain an action upon proof of special damage, however, the injury must arise
from the loss of an asset of measurable value. See notes 29, 31 supra. The Court in
Gertz did not wish to limit plaintiff's recovery in such a manner and expressly stated
that direct pecuniary loss was not prerequisite to recovery.
56. 418 U.S. at 350. Because the Court listed all these compensable injuries to-
gether, it was unclear from the opinion whether injury to reputation was intended as
a predicate to recovery for the other injuries. Many commentators have considered the
case to require proof of injury to reputation before damages may be awarded for other
types of injuries. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 7, at 471-73; Eaton, supra note 7, at
1437-39. Moreover, the Restatement has added a new section which implements the
Gertz actual injury requirement: "One who is liable for a defamatory communication
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ever, must be supported by "competent evidence.157
The effect of Gertz is to require that all damages be alleged and
proved if they are to be recovered. 58  Harm to reputation, for example,
must be alleged separately from harm to mental comfort. Implicit in
the imposition of the actual damages requirement was the related prop-
osition that any form of damages, properly proved, would sustain a def-
amation action so long as defendant's statement was defamatory in na-
ture.59 In Time, Inc. v. Firestone,"0 the Court elevated this proposition
to the status of a rule of law. Plaintiff withdrew her claim of injury
to reputation on the eve of trial, and relied instead solely on her claim
of mental pain and anguish.61 The Court held that recovery on this
basis was entirely consistent with Gertz.62
is liable for the proved, actual harm caused to the reputation of the person defamed."
RESTATEMENT § 621 (Tent. Draft No. 21, 1975) (emphasis added). The comments to
this section further note that "general damages are imposed for the purpose of compen-
sating the plaintiff for the harm which the publication has caused to his reputation ...
Recovery may also be had for emotional distress and resulting bodily harm." Id., com-
ment a, at 78 (emphasis added). See also id. § 623 (Tent. Draft No. 20, 1974) (con-
cerning damages for emotional distress).
57. 418 U.S. at 350. Presumably, this evidence must prove both the'fact and the
extent of injury, although "there need be no evidence which assigns an actual dollar
value to the injury." Id. Since the determination of what is "competent evidence" is
necessarily a judicial function, this requirement provides judges with great discretion to
limit the ultimate disposition of the case by the jury. Moreover, the common law rule
is that the judge determines what injuries are compensable and the jury merely assesses
damages. See RESTATEMENT § 616 (Tent. Draft No. 20, 1974). This rule enables
judges to limit jury discretion in awarding damages by withholding from the jury certain
injuries. The Court seemed aware of this rule when it stated that "juries must be limited
by appropriate instructions. ... 418 U.S. at 350.
58. This conclusion follows from the abolishment of the doctrine of presumed dam-
ages, which obviated the necessity for pleading actual damages. See, e.g., Eaton, supra
note 7, at 1434.
59. This reading of Gertz results from the failure of the Court to distinguish be-
tween the different types of injuries to which a defamation gives rise. See 418 U.S. at
350.
60. 424 U.S. 448 (1976). Plaintiff Mary Alice Firestone was the wife of the son
of one of the richest families in America. She filed for divorce, and he counterclaimed
on grounds of extreme cruelty and adultery. The counterclaim was granted though the
opinion was somewhat less than lucid as to the grounds for the divorce. In fact, the
Supreme Court of Florida twice considered the issue and each time arrived at a different
conclusion. See id. at 478 n.8, 480 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Time magazine
reported in its "Milestones" section that the divorce was granted on the grounds set out
in the husband's complaint: "The 17-month intermittent trial produced enough testi-
mony of extramarital adventures on both sides, said the judge, 'to make Dr. Freud's hair
curl.'" See id. at 452. Mrs. Firestone brought a libel action against the magazine and
the jury awarded her $100,000. The Florida Supreme Court and the United States Su-
preme Court both affirmed the verdict.
61. See id. at 460.
62. Petitioner's theory seems to be that the only compensable injury in a
defamation action is that which may be done to one's reputation, and that
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Thus, in one sense privacy and defamation are now more distinct
forms of action; in another, their overlap is emphasized more than ever
before. The torts are more distinct in that one may recover for injury
to reputation and yet not recover for any accompanying mental distress
unless this injury is also pleaded and proved. This result is a direct
product of the interment of the doctrine of presumed damages. At
the same time, however, the torts resemble one another more closely
in a case like Firestone, where the only injury proved was mental dis-
tress. In such a case, the only effective distinction between the torts
lies in the character of the words used by the defendant. If the words
have a tendency to injure reputation, an action in defamation will lie.
If the words do not have the tendency to "diminish the esteem, respect,
goodwill, or confidence in which the plaintiff is held,"6 then the proper
action is in privacy. Although the common law also acknowledged
this overlap,64 it was not always clear in a given case whether reputation
had in fact been injured, since there was no need to distinguish among
the bases for recovery. 65 To the extent that this ambiguity existed,
the overlap between defamation and privacy was obscured.
claims not predicated upon such injury are by definition not actions for defa-
mation. But Florida has obviously decided to permit recovery for other
injuries without regard to measuring the effect the falsehood may have had
upon a plaintiff's reputation. This does not transform the action into some-
thing other than an action for defamation as that term is meant in Gertz.
Id.
Gertz suggested that the potential for harm to reputation was what earmarked an action
in defamation, see Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 348 (1974), and to this
extent, the Court's statement in Firestone appears to be true. The common law's empha.
sis on "tendency" to injure reputation, however, arose out of the difficulties inherent in
assessing damages for injured reputation, see note 30 supra, and was inextricably bound
up with the doctrine of presumed damages. That the common law admitted there were
difficulties of proof, however, does not alter the fact that "damage to reputation is, of
course, the essence of libel." Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 275 (1971).
Moreover, in a very famous and much quoted statement, Sir Frederick Pollock com-
mented that "The law went wrong in the beginning in making the damage and not the
insult the cause of action." F. POLLOCK, THE LAW OF TORTS, 249 (13th ed. 1929),
quoted in W. PROSSER § 111, at 737 n.5. Gertz in no way suggests that the focus of an
action in defamation has somehow been altered so that now the insult and not the injury
is the cause of action. The Court's abolishment of presumed damages, therefore, necessi-
tates the elimination of the "tendency" aspect of the definition of defamation so that
the action remains the protector of the interest in reputation. See text accompanying
notes 155-60 infra. See generally Anderson, supra note 7, at 472; Eaton, supra note
7, at 1437-39. As the latter article notes, "Negligent infliction of mental distress may
well be a tort, but it is not the tort of defamation." Id. at 1438.
63. W. PROSSER § 11, at 739.
64. See text accompanying notes 39-40 supra.
65. This conclusion follows from the fact that instructions to the jury generally did
not differentiate among the specific injuries which may have been incurred because all
general damages were presumed. See notes 29, 40 supra.
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Because Gertz has made the overlap between defamation and pri-
vacy so apparent, its logic may compel transferral of the negligence
standard into the privacy area. In order to determine whether Gertz
should be so extended, however, it is first necessary to analyze more
closely the interests protected by actions in privacy and defamation.
I. THE CONCEPTUAL DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN
DEFAMATION AND PRIVACY
A. Historical Origins
From their beginnings in the early common law, defamation ac-
tions have been concerned with the protection of reputation against
injury from false statements of fact.6 Reputation was seen primarily
as a property right, 67 though elements of "honor" were implicit in the
concept.68 Moreover, stated opinions of the plaintiff were not the con-
cern of defamation law. 9 It is only where the defendant made factual
66. Reputation is the interest which defamation law is designed to protect. See note
26 supra and accompanying text. Moreover, the statement must be false, since truth
is recognized at common law as an absolute defense in a civil libel action. See W. Pnos-
sE § 116, at 796-99 and cases cited therein; RESTATEMENT § 582 (Tent. Draft No. 20,
1974) and cases cited therein. For a brief discussion of the way in which the Supreme
Court has treated the defense of truth, see note 41 supra. Finally, the statement must be
one of fact, not opinion. See note 69 infra. For a general discussion of the history of
defamation at common law, see Holdsworth, Defamation in the Sixteenth and Seven-
teenth Centuries (pts. 1-3), 40 L.Q. REv. 302 & 397, 41 L.Q. REv. 13 (1924-25); Lovell,
The "Reception" of Defamation by the Common Law, 15 VAND. L. REv. 1051 (1962);
Veeder, The History and Theory of the Law of Defamation (pts. 1-2), 3 COLUM. L.
REv. 546, 4 COLUM. L. REv. 33 (1903-04).
67. Warren and Brandeis thought that defamation was an inadequate instrument to
protect the right of privacy because "the wrongs and correlative rights recognized by the
law of slander and libel are in their nature material rather than spiritual. That branch
of the law simply extends the protection surrounding physical property to certain of the
conditions necessary or helpful to worldly prosperity." Warren and Brandeis at 197. It
has also been recognized that the interest in reputation "so far as the law recognizes
it as a proper subject for protection, is essentially one of substance." Pound, Interests
of Personality, 28 HART. L. REv. 445, 446 (1915). Pound did acknowledge, however,
that there were other less material aspects to the reputation interest. See note 68 infra.
68. Dean Pound viewed reputation as an interest of both "personality" and "sub-
stance." Pound, supra note 67, at 446-49. Defamation was intended primarily to re-
dress the latter, id. at 446, but "[h]istorically it is quite false to treat the subject from
the standpoint of a securing of interests of substance only." Id. Rather, elements of
"honor," an interest of personality, were obviously part of the concept of reputation or
else there are "logical anomalies from the standpoint of such a theory. . . ." Id. at 447.
69. Defamatory communications most often consist of statements of fact. See RE-
STATEMENT § 565 (Tent. Draft No. 20, 1974) and cases cited therein. The obvious rea-
son for this pattern is that only facts are capable of being true or false. See F. HARPER
& F. JAMES § 5.8. While opinion, therefore, is almost always non-actionable as a de-
famatory communication, two exceptions had been carved out by the common law.
Statements of opinion were actionable where the opinion was expressed on facts known
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statements about the plaintiff, and where these statements were untrue,
that defamation law provided the plaintiff with a remedy.
Privacy actions, on the other hand, were originally seen as a pro-
tection against publicity, whether the statements were true or false. 70
In their famous article, Warren and Brandeis observed that something
akin to a right of privacy had been protected under the aegis of a num-
ber of different legal doctrines. 71  They noted that defamation, 72 copy-
right,7 3 and the doctrines of implied trusts and breach of confidence74
all had elements of a right of privacy in them and were sometimes
used to vindicate this right. In their view, the unifying principle in
all these cases was the right to choose how and in what manner one
would appear before the public.75 The focus was on dignity and the
or assumed by the parties to the communication or where the opinion was expressed
upon undisclosed facts. See RESTATEMENT §§ 566-67 (Tent. Draft No. 20, 1974) and
cases cited therein. See also HARPER & JAMES § 5.8. If, in the former case, the under-
lying facts were true, the expressed opinion was deemed too intimately related to the
facts to be separated from them. See id. If sufficiently derogatory, the opinion was
actionable. See RESTATEMENT § 566, comment a and illustration at 41-42 (Tent. Draft
No. 20, 1974). Similarly, where the underlying facts were undisclosed, it appeared that
the publisher had some special knowledge upon which to base his opinion, so that the
opinion implied a fact about plaintiff. See F. HARPER & F. JAMES § 5.8; RESTATEMENT
§ 567, comment a and illustration at 43 (Tent. Draft No. 20, 1974). See also id. §
567A and cases cited therein.
The Court in Gertz recognized the fact-opinion distinction as a matter of constitu-
tional law, and abolished the two common law exceptions:
Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea. However
pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the con-
science of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas. But there
is no constitutional value in false statements of fact. 418 U.S. at 339-40.
Thus, opinion is constitutionally protected from actions for defamation under the first
amendment, regardless of the form in which the opinion is expressed.
70. See note 78 infra.
71. Warren & Brandeis at 214-19.
72. See id. at 197. The law of defamation was considered too "material," however,
to provide adequate redress for the "spiritual" interests they felt the right of privacy pro-
tects. See note 67 supra. See also Kalven, supra note 32, at 328-39. Warren and Bran-
deis did view defamation as an acceptable analogy with reference to the limitations on
the right of privacy and the appropriate remedies. See Warren & Brandeis at 214-19.
73. "[Ihe legal doctrines relating to infractions of what is ordinarily termed the
common-law right to intellectual and artistic property are, it is believed, but instances
and applications of a general right to privacy. . . ." Warren & Brandeis at 198. But
see Kalven, supra note 32, at 329-30.
74. For example, the doctrines of implied trusts and breach of confidence were uti-
lized to enable one whose letters were in the hands of another to bring an action to
prohibit or to recover for the publication of those letters by the other. See Warren &
Brandeis at 207-13. It was concluded, however, that "[tihe principle which protects
personal writings and any other productions of the intellect or of the emotions, is the
right to privacy .. " Id. at 213.
75. "If you may not reproduce a woman's face photographically without her con-
sent, how much less should be tolerated the reproduction of her face, her form, and her
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"inviolate personality": 76  certain aspects of each individual's life de-
serve protection from public scrutiny.77  Warren and Brandeis, there-
fore, made no distinctions between publicity that was true and publicity
that was false; 78 both merited condemnation.
The modem tort of invasion of privacy takes a more expansive
view of the protected interests,7" though the ground for recovery has
not been altered. An appreciation of the origins of the tort, however,
provides a basis for distinguishing it from defamation. The mental
injuries suffered by a privacy plaintiff stem from exposure of the pri-
vate self to public view. The mental injuries suffered by a defamation
victim, by contrast, arise as a consequence of the damage to reputation,
either real or perceived.80  Thus, both torts provide redress for
"wounded feelings," but the source of the harm differs substantially.8 '
actions, by graphic descriptions colored to suit a gross and depraved imagination." War-
ren & Brandeis at 214. The focus of the Warren and Brandeis article was on the types
of privacy now known as "publicity given to private affairs" and "false light privacy."
See note 32 supra. See Kalven, supra note 32, at 330; Prosser, supra note 32, at 384.
76. See Warren & Brandeis at 205. A tone of Victorian spirituality and "injured
gentility" found throughout the article has been noted elsewhere. See Bloustein, supra
note 32; Kalven, supra note 32, at 329.
77. It is unclear precisely which aspects are deserving of protection, at least where
the publicity is truthful, because of the "newsworthiness" defense. This defense is avail-
able to publishers in all instances where the publicized statements are conceivably within
the realm of legitimate public interest. Warren and Brandeis themselves first suggested
this defense, see Warren & Brandeis at 214-16, and courts have expanded the availability
of the defense to include a wide range of events. Tnus, in one leading case, the peculiar
habits of a former child prodigy, who desired only obscurity, were held to be within the
public interest. See Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940). For
a more complete discussion of the newsworthiness defense, see Pember & Teeter, supra
note 32, at 69-73 and cases cited therein. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967), ex-
tends the actual malice standard to all false reports of "matters of public interest,"
Id. at 387-88, thereby imposing a limited newsworthiness defense when the reports are
untrue.
Justice Marshall dissented in Rosenbloom partly because of his fear that imple-
mentation of the actual malice standard in the "matters of public interest" context would
lead to the same substantial destruction of protection from defamation that the news-
worthiness standard had brought about in cases of privacy. See Rosenbloom v. Metro-
media, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 80 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
78. Warren and Brandeis noted that the truth or falsity of the publicized statement
is irrelevant when the protected right is that of privacy, since the mere publicity creates
the cause of action: "The [right of privacy] implies the right not merely to prevent
inaccurate portrayal of private life, but to prevent its being depicted at all." Warren
& Brandeis at 218.
79. See note 32 supra.
80. See text accompanying notes 87-92 infra.
81. "It is not for injury to the individual's character that redress or prevention is
sought, but for injury to the right of privacy." Warren & Brandeis at 218. See text
accompanying notes 95-97 infra.
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B. Nature of the Injuries
"Reputation" has always been an elusive concept to define.8 2  It
has been suggested that reputation is a "relational" interest that takes
its form from the relations one has with one's family, one's employer
or customers, one's friends, and even society at large, where potential
relationships exist.8 3  Reputation thus reflects one's economic relation-
ships as well as one's "honor."84 To the extent that reputation impli-
cates the attitudes of third persons, it is a very tangible notion which
can be ascertained with some sophistication by the objective techniques
of modem social science.8 5  While these methods may be infrequently
82. Traditionally, injury to reputation has been defined in terms of the hatred, con-
tempt, or ridicule of others. See W. PROSSER § 111, at 739. This definition has since
been expanded to include diminished esteem, respect, goodwill, or confidence in the
plaintiff. See id. Recently, however, an attempt has been made to view "reputation"
from a psychological and linguistic standpoint. The word has been considered merely
a symbol for a host of intellectual, behavioral and legal concepts, which include not
only the external relationships an individual may have with others, but also his psychic
reactions to the altered relationships. See Pound, supra note 67, at 445-53; Probert,
Defamation, A Camouflage of Psychic Interests: The Beginning of a Behavioral
Analysis, 15 VAND. L. REv. 1173, 1175-85 (1962).
83. See W. PROSSER § 111, at 737; Anderson, supra note 7, at 470-71; Green, Rela-
tional Interests, 31 ILL. L. REV. 35, 37-44 (1936); Probert, supra note 82, at 1178-79.
84. See notes 67-68 supra.
85. The relevant factor in defamation actions is, of course, plaintiff's reputed char-
acter and not what character he actually possesses. See 1 J. WIGMORE, TREATISE ON
EviDENCE § 70 (3d ed. 1940). Social scientists have developed several means of meas-
uring an individual's attitude and the degree of his attitude change. One technique
measures attitude indirectly by presenting the individual with a series of "belief state-
ments" which have been scaled according to whether the item expresses favorability or
unfavorability toward the attitude object (in this case, the defamed person) and by ask-
ing the individual whether he agrees or disagrees with these statements. Another tech-
nique is to ask the individual directly for his evaluation of the attitude object and either
to record his statement of "like" or "dislike" or to measure his physiological reaction
to the question by some mechanical means. Still another method utilizes reports of past
or intended behavior toward the attitude object. For a brief description of all of these
techniques, see Himmelfarb & Eagly, Orientations to the Study of Attitudes and their
Change, in READINGS IN ATrrrUD CHANGE 2, 6-8 (S. Himmelfarb & A. Eagly, eds.
1974). See also G. SUMMERS, ArrrrTUE MEASUREMENT (1970).
These methods might be applied to a significant sample of persons in plaintiff's
community, or to all those who might reasonably be expected to have been exposed to
the publication, by means of a poll or survey. Simple applications of such polling tech-
niques have been made with some success in the criminal area as an aid to a motion
for a change of venue or a continuance of the trial of an unpopular defendant. See
Sherman, The Use of Public Opinion Polls in Continuance and Venue Hearings, 50
A.B.A.J. 357 (1964). It would seem, then, that such methods could be used to deter-
mine with some accuracy changes in third persons' attitudes toward plaintiff, that is,
changes in plaintiff's reputation.
Thus, reputation is a considerably more concrete interest than the interest in mental
comfort because it is susceptible to more objective proof and measurement. Damage to
reputation can be ascertained with far more sophistication and accuracy than the wholly
subjective injury of mental suffering. See note 86 infra.
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employed in practice,8 6 their theoretical usefulness serves to demon-
strate the concreteness of the interest.
At common law, mental suffering was viewed not as a separate
component of damages, but as an integral part of the general dam-
ages presumed from the defamation.s7  Wigmore in his famous treatise
on evidence states that "the injury to feelings which the law of
defamation recognizes is not the suffering from the making of the
charge, but is that suffering which is caused by other people's conduct
towards [the plaintiff] in consequence of it."' 8  Thus, the emotional
damage is really a reflection of the harm done externally: the plaintiff
may think differently of himself as a result of the defamatory utter-
ance. "" He may suffer harm to dignity, pride and self-esteem. 90  It
86. Evidence of plaintiff's character has generally been held admissible either to
mitigate or to enhance plaintiff's recovery. 1 J. WrGMoRE, supra note 85, at § 70.
Whether such evidence is admissible when compiled by survey, however, poses a differ-
ent set of problems. Survey evidence is generally admissible when the survey is con-
ducted by recognized experts according to accepted scientific principles. See, e.g., Zippo
Mfg. Co. v. Rogers Imports, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 670, 682 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Zeisel, The
Uniqueness of Survey Evidence, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 322, 345-46 (1960). Survey evi-
dence, however, often violates the hearsay and opinion rules of evidence and has on this
basis sometimes been excluded. See McCoid, The Admissibility of Sample Data into
a Court of Law: Some Further Thoughts, 4 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 233, 235-47 (1957); Zei-
sel, supra, at 333-37. To some extent this difficulty is obviated by the "state of mind"
exception to the hearsay rule, which permits admission of hearsay evidence offered to
show a relevant present state of mind, attitude or belief on the part of the declarant.
See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Rogers Imports, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 670, 683 (S.D.N.Y. 1963);
Zeisel, supra, at 333-34. Since the matter in question is reputed character, a determina-
tion which is dependent on the attitudes of the survey interviewees, the hearsay problem
can be substantially avoided.
The major difficulty for the litigant is the expense of such a survey. The scientific
validity of the survey is an important criterion for its admissibility, and the cost of con-
ducting a scientifically valid survey would probably be prohibitive for most plaintiffs.
Thus, even if the hearsay problem is surmounted, this remaining difficulty obviously
makes the use of such surveys largely impractical.
87. See note 31 supra.
88. 1 J. WIGMORE, supra note 85, at § 209. Wigmore emphasizes that "[rieputation
is the ultimate fact" and that "the harm for which compensation is asked is the loss
of social relations, as involved in the diminished reputation of the plaintiff." Id. Thus,
recovery for mental injuries is merely consequential to the damage to reputation. But
see Kelly v. Loew's, Inc., 76 F. Supp. 473, 488-89 (D. Mass. 1948); Curley v. Curtis
Publishing Co., 48 F. Supp. 27, 28 (D. Mass. 1942).
89. See Probert, supra note 82, at 1179-85:
Since reputation is not something which exists separate from a person,
since as a term it is included in the field of terms bearing on human be-
havior, and since usually the person is affected whose reputation is affected,
then that person may be affected in ways we will more readily recognize as
intra-personal rather than inter-personal. While the defendant's utterance
may suggest what he thinks of plaintiff and may give some basis for our
inferring how some others may come to think of plaintiff, it may also give
a basis for inferring what plaintiff may feel about himself and others. Id. at
1181.
This conclusion also follows as a consequence of Wigmore's observation, see note 88
supra and accompanying text, since the mental injuries flow from a damaged reputation.
90. See Probert, supra note 82, at 1181.
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will be recalled that the common law did not distinguish between def-
amation which actually harmed reputation and defamation which
tended to harm reputation.91 It follows that the mental suffering ele-
ment of defamation arises from a fear that others might behave differ-
ently toward the defamed person rather than from the certainty that
they in fact do behave differently.9"
It is difficult to imagine, however, why a plaintiff may think dif-
ferently of himself when others do not think differently of him. Since
the common law presumed harm from defamatory falsehoods, this in-
consistency was never manifest.93  By eliminating presumed damages,
Gertz reveals this inconsistency and raises the question of whether
mental injuries unrelated to actual harm to reputation should be com-
pensated for in a defamation action. Mental injuries in such a case
seem to arise from publicity and not from the altered conduct of third
persons. 4 Thus, an action in privacy appears to be more appropriate.
The mental injuries which result from invasion of privacy do not
differ substantially from the mental injuries in defamation. The pri-
vacy plaintiff suffers embarrassment and humiliation, which are virtu-
ally indistinguishable from harm to pride and self-esteem. 5 In defa-
mation actions, however, the injuries result from real or imagined harm
to reputation, an objectively determinable interest.90 In privacy actions
the injuries arise solely from public exposure of private facts.97 The
subjective character of these injuries is mitigated only by the require-
ment that the exposure be "highly offensive to a reasonable person"9' 8
or to a person of "ordinary sensibilities."99  This requirement is de-
signed to safeguard against trivial claims,100 but its efficacy is question-
able; 101 adequate protection of free speech interests would appear to
91. See text accompanying notes 27-30 supra.
92. See Anderson, supra note 7, at 471; cf. Probert, supra note 82, at 1182.
93. See note 40 supra and accompanying text.
94. See text accompanying notes 165-66 infra.
95. Indeed, humiliation is defined in terms of lost pride and self-esteem. See WaB-
sTER's NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1101 (3d ed. 1961).
96. See text accompanying notes 82-86 supra.
97. See text accompanying notes 70-78 supra.
98. See RESTATEMENT §§ 652D-652E (Tent. Draft No. 22, 1976). See also W.
PROSSER § 117, at 813 and cases cited therein.
99. See Prosser, supra note 32, at 396-97.
100. See RESTATEMENT § 65ZE, comment c at 33 (Tent. Draft No. 22, 1976); Pros-
ser, supra note 32, at 396-97.
101. At least one commentator has viewed this requirement as insufficient, since "the
upshot is that every unconsented-to reference in the press creates prima facie a cause
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require the retention of the current actual malice standard.102
C. "Pure" Mental Injury and the Common Law
Because defamation and invasion of privacy both contain elements
of mental injury, a comparison of these torts with cases of "pure" men-
tal injury helps to provide an understanding of the different policies
at stake. Pure mental injury is that which is unaccompanied by any
other legal invasion of the rights of the injured party.10 3 Recovery
for pure mental injury has been allowed only recently'04 because of
the common law's fear of the administrative and philosophical diffi-
culties which would arise from actions based solely on mental distress.
The primary concerns were with the potential for trivial or fictitious
claims,10 5 the impossibility of determining damages, 06 and the prob-
lems of establishing causation.107 Modern jurisprudence views the first
difficulty as the only one of real substance, 08 and gradually the tort
of "infliction of emotional distress" has come to be recognized.'0 9
The evolution of this tort has depended on advances in both sci-
ence and the law. Medical science is now able to detect physical mani-
festations of mental injuries with some certainty, thereby reducing the
danger of imposture.1 0 The law has recognized that mental injuries
may occur without any precedent physical injury,1" and that adherence
of action that could take the plaintiff to the jury." See Kalven, supra note 32, at 334.
Once before the jury, plaintiff can recover a large verdict because of the difficulties of
proving the mental injuries: "[I]t remains odd to give recovery for- emotional dis-
turbance without any showing that plaintiff suffered or was upset." Id. These difficul-
ties, plus the added "lack of legal profile" for the tort, raise the question of whether
the right of privacy should be recognized at all. See id. at 337. Though it is unlikely
the courts will abandon their recognition of the right, the problems raised by Professor
Kalven are important factors to consider in the determination of whether the Gertz prin-
ciples should be extended into the law of privacy. See text accompanying notes 126-
37 infra. But cf. Wade, supra note 32, at 1122-23.
102. See text accompanying notes 126-44 infra.
103. See W. PRossER § 12, at 49-50; cf. Warren & Brandeis at 197 n.1.
104. See W. PROSSER § 12, at 52-53. See generally RESTATEMENT § 46, comments
b and c at 72.
105. See W. PROSSER § 12, at 51 and cases cited therein.
106. "Mental pain or anxiety the law cannot value, and does not pretend to redress,
when the unlawful act causes that alone." Lynch v. Knight, 9 H.L.C. 577, 598, 11 Eng.
Rep. 854 (1861), quoted in W. PROSSER § 12, at 50.
k07. See W. PROSSER § 12, at 50-51 and cases cited therein.
108. See id. at 51.
109. See RESTATEMENT § 46.
110. See W. PROSSER § 54, at 328 and authorities cited therein.
111. Prior to recognition of the mental distress tort, the law required that there be
some physical "impact" upon plaintiff before recovery could be had for any mental in-
juries. Thus, the courts conditioned recovery upon proof of assault, battery, false im-
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to the ideal of making every plaintiff whole requires compensation for
such injuries.
The law does, however, impose stringent safeguards to ensure that
the mental injury has in fact occurred. First, recovery is restricted
to those instances where the tortious conduct is "shocking" or "out-
rageous."' 12  Second, the vast majority of jurisdictions require that the
mental distress be accompanied by physical symptoms before recovery
will be allowed."'3  Even in those jurisdictions which have no require-
ment of physical symptoms, the circumstances of the tort must be such
as to ensure the fact of emotional upset." 4  Finally, the almost uni-
versal ruling of the courts has been that the tortious conduct, in addition
to its outrageous character, must be intentional." 5
These safeguards have traditionally been thought unnecessary in
defamation actions because the defamatory character of the falsehood
has itself been considered sufficient proof of injuries to reputation
and mental comfort. 11 After Gertz, however, damages may not be
prisonment, trespass or nuisance, no matter how slight or evanescent the "touching" may
have been. See generally id. § 12, at 55-56. It appears that now, however, the law
has come full-circle, at least with respect to intentional torts, so that "conduct which
is tortious because intended to result in bodily harm to another or in the invasion of
any other of his legally protected interests does not make the actor liable for an emo-
tional distress which is the only legal consequence of his conduct." RESTATEMENT § 47.
The law requires that the emotional upset in fact occur and that it be severe. The
emotional distress may include such reactions as "fright, horror, grief, shame, humilia-
tion, embarrassment, anger, chagrin, disappointment, worry, and nausea." RESTATE-
MENT § 46, comment j at 77. These injuries may also result from either defamation,
see text accompanying note 90 supra, or invasion of privacy, see text accompanying note
95 supra, but the difference is one of degree:
It is only where [the injury] is extreme that the liability arises. Complete
emotional tranquility is seldom attainable in this world, and some degree of
transient and trivial emotional distress is a part of the price of living among
people. The law intervenes only where the distress inflicted is so severe that
no reasonable man could be expected to endure it. RESTATEMENT § 46, com-
ment j at 77.
By contrast, defamation and privacy impose no requirement that the mental injuries be
severe, since the legal invasion of right is considered adequate proof of the mental injury.
112. This requirement must be met in order for the action to be successful regardless
of whether defendant acted intentionally or with malice. See RESTATEMENT § 46, com-
ment d at 72-73. The law is stringent in imposing this requirement. Id.
113. See W. PROSSER § 12, at 59 and cases cited therein.
114. See id. at 59-60 and cases cited therein. The Restatement adopts this latter po-
sition. See RESTATEMENT § 46, comment k at 78. For examples of the type of out-
rageous behavior which by itself "carries conviction that there has in fact been severe
emotional distress," see the illustrations to comment k.
115. See W. PROSSER § 12, at 60; RESTATEMENT § 46, comment i at 77. A few cases
have permitted liability on a mere showing of recklessness, see cases cited in W. PROSSER
§ 12, at 60, and the Restatement also acknowledges this approach. See RESTATEMENT
§ 46, comment i at 77. The "actual malice" standard established by the Supreme Court
in defamation and privacy cases also involves recklessness. See note 14 supra.
116. See text accompanying notes 29-31 supra.
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presumed from the defamatory character of the words; proof of actual
injury and fault on the part of the defendant are required.11 7  By re-
jecting the doctrine of presumed damages, the Court made clear that
basing recovery on the mere defamatory character of the words does
not provide adequate protection against trivial claims in light of the
first amendment interests involved. Similarly, in privacy actions the
public exposure of private facts has been deemed adequate evidence
of the fact of injury, so long as the exposure is sufficiently offensive. 8
In Time, Inc. v. Hill,'1 however, the Supreme Court felt the additional
protection of the actual malice standard was necessary to avert the dan-
ger of self-censorship.
IM. RECONCILIATION: DEFAMATION, PRIVACY
AND FREE SPEECH
With its recognition in Firestone that a defamation plaintiff need
only prove mental suffering in order to recover damages,' 20 the Su-
preme Court may have effectively extended the Gertz principles into
the area of privacy. Firestone, however, is not a privacy case. It is
unclear, therefore, how the Court will respond when faced with a pri-
vacy case which presents the contention that the actual malice standard
is inappropriate where plaintiff is not a public figure. Three alterna-
tives appear open to the Court: (1) explicitly extend the Gertz princi-
ples into the privacy area; (2) distinguish privacy from defamation and
retain the actual malice standard in all privacy cases; or (3) modify
Firestone and require that in defamation actions actual harm to reputa.
tion must be shown as a prerequisite to recovery for mental suffering.
117. See text accompanying notes 53-57 supra.
118. Warren and Brandeis created the right of privacy so that mental injuries result-
ing from unwarranted publicity might be redressed. See text accompanying notes 70-
78 supra. The Restatement declares that a plaintiff who has established that his privacy
has been invaded may recover for mental injury suffered "if it is of a kind which nor-
mally results from such an invasion, and it is normal and reasonable in its extent." RE-
STATEMENT § 652H, comment b at 40 (Tent. Draft No. 22, 1976). The Restatement
seeks to avoid the presumed damages problem by requiring that plaintiff "prove" the
mental injuries he "actually" suffered. See id. Its reliance upon such words as "nor-
mally" and "normal and reasonable," however, indicates the inherent difficulty of prov-
ing actual damages from mental injury. See id. The Restatement's dilemma, therefore,
suggests that Professor Kalven is correct when he states, "The theory of damages
[in privacy] is equally vague and mysterious insofar as damages are supposed to be com-
pensatory." Kalven, supra note 32, at 334. Mental injuries, even when coupled with
an invasion of the right of privacy, are simply too tenuous to support a claim for com-
pensation on a showing of mere negligence. See text accompanying notes 141-44 infra.
Cf. Anderson, supra note 7, at 471-72.
119. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
120. See notes 61-62 supra and accompanying text.
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A. Extending Gertz to Privacy Cases
An extension of the Gertz principles into the privacy area would
mean that a privacy plaintiff's burden would vary according to whether
he was a public figure or a private individual. 12  The rationale for
the public-private plaintiff distinction in the defamation area is that
the public figure assumes the risk of defamatory falsehood by thrusting
himself into the public view.122  Since he has voluntarily assumed his
position,'2 3 he cannot expect the same protection as can a private indi-
vidual who has not sought public exposure. Moreover, his prominence
as a public figure provides him with greater opportunity to rebut de-
famatory charges. 24 The private individual does not have the same
access to a public forum to protest false statements about him. For
these reasons, he is held to be deserving of greater protection' 25 and
need only prove negligence to recover for defamation.
Viewed solely from the perspective of the plaintiff's interests, this
rationale should apply with equal force in the privacy area, since a
public figure's voluntary exposure permits increased scrutiny of his pri-
vate life by the media. When viewed from the defendant's perspec-
tive, however, the inappropriateness of extending the Gertz distinction
to privacy cases becomes apparent: such an extension ignores the dif-
121. Cf. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344-46 (1974).
122. See id. at 345. The basis for this distinction comes from Chief Justice Warren's
concurring opinion in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164-65 (1967)
(Warren, C.J., concurring). That case extended the New York Times standard to in-
stances in which plaintiff is a public figure. Chief Justice Warren reasoned that the
modem era had brought together the governmental and private sectors and there was
simply no reason to apply a different standard to those who moved back and forth along
the interface. See id. at 163-64. Consequently, the first amendment required that defend-
ants should be permitted the same "breathing space" irrespective of whether the plaintiff
is a public official or a public figure. See id. at 148-49, 163.
Gertz adopted the Chief Justice's rationale but also expanded upon it. The Court
noted that individuals may achieve public figure status in different ways. 418 U.S. at
345. All public figures, however, must prove actual malice to be successful in their suit.
The Court's emphasis in Gertz on the relationship between public figures and "par-
ticular public controversies," id. at 351-52, might be viewed as a return to the Rosen-
bloom rationale of protection of all matters of "public or general concern." Cf. Rosen-
bloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 44 (1971). The Court explicitly rejected this
standard, however, because "it would occasion the additional difficulty of forcing state
and federal judges to decide on an ad hoc basis which publications address issues of 'gen-
eral or public interest' and which do not. . . ." 418 U.S. at 346. Nevertheless, in
Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976), the Court made this ad hoc determination,
see id. at 454, prompting a vigorous dissent from Justice Marshall who viewed Mrs.
Firestone as a public figure. See id. at 484-90 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
123. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974).
124. Id. at 344.
125. Id.
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fering degrees of protection for defendants which are inherent in def-
amation and privacy actions.
Defamation actions have traditionally provided compensation for
injury to reputation and consequential mental suffering,12 6 while pri-
vacy actions compensate directly for mental suffering, a far more sub-
jective form of injury.' 27  The law has always recognized the difficulty
of assessing or even detecting mental suffering in the absence of an
underlying concrete injury. 28 While injury to reputation has fre-
quently been difficult to prove, the difficulty generally arose from the
problem of procuring witnesses and from other external circumstances
rather than from the intrinsic nature of the injury.'29 The Gertz Court,
perhaps perceiving this fact, abolished presumed damages and imposed
an actual injury requirement to limit defendant's liability.3 0
In privacy actions, however, as in most other tort actions, the
plaintiff has always been required to show actual injury.' The danger
of excessive verdicts in privacy actions arises from the nature of the
injury itself rather than from extrinsic circumstances. 3 2  Thus, while
126. See text accompanying notes 26-31 supra.
127. See note 36 supra and accompanying text.
128. See text accompanying notes 104-07 supra.
129. See note 30 supra. Reputation is an objectively quantifiable relational interest,
see note 85 supra and accompanying text, and hence third parties could testify as to their
attitude toward plaintiff before and after the defamatory communication. See C. Mc-
CORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAw or DAMAGES § 117, at 429 (1935); cf. Anderson,
supra note 7, at 470-71. The distinction between injury to such an interest and mental
suffering is that in the former the changed attitudes of third persons mark the degree
of damage while in the latter only the changed attitude of the plaintiff is relevant. The
relative unreliability of the testimony of the plaintiff is self-evident. See, e.g., id. at 472.
In Firestone, plaintiff's claim of mental suffering was supported by the testimony of her
minister, friends, and doctor. The doctor had administered a single sedative to her and
described the degree of her anxiety. 424 U.S. at 460 n.6. Plaintiff also testified as to
her fear that her young son might be adversely affected when he grew older. Id. at
461. Such testimony, of course, is all that might be expected when the injuries are
purely mental, and in the physical torts, such testimony adequately supports claims of
"pain and suffering." These cases, however, do not involve problems of self-censorship
and the first amendment, and furthermore, the relationship between the physical injury
and the mental injury limits the extent of defendant's liability for pain and suffering.
See note 162 infra and accompanying text.
130. See text accompanying notes 53-57 supra. The actual injury requirement is in-
tended as the primary protection for the media against excessive jury verdicts. See
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia,
Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 66 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting). "The size of the potential judg-
ment that may be rendered against the press must be the most significant factor in pro-
ducing self-censorship. . . ." Id. at 82 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see id. at 82-84.
131. The doctrine of presumed damages was unique to defamation and trespass. See
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974); W. PRossER § 13, at 66.
132. Several commentators expressed concern after Gertz that the actual injury re-
quirement might be an inadequate protection against self-censorship if damages for
mental injury alone were allowed:
1042
Vol. 1976:1016] DEFAMATION AND PRIVACY
the actual injury requirement in Gertz is intended to compensate de-
fendants for the lower measure of constitutional protection available
to them when private plaintiffs bring the suit,133 no similar compensat-
ing feature would exist in privacy actions if a negligence standard were
to be imposed. The only comparable protection for defendants in pri-
vacy actions is found in the requirement that the tortious conduct be
"highly offensive to a reasonable person";13 4 but the presence of first
amendment considerations mandates some stricter form of protec-
tion."'35 Absent such protection, there is little to stand in the way of
trivial claims and excessive jury verdicts, with the ever-present possi-
bility of media self-censorship. 36 The problem is compounded by the
enormous discretion allotted jurors in determining what is adequate
compensation for injuries.'3 7
It is difficult to see how injuries such as 'personal humiliation' and 'mental
anguish' can be established except by a process that in practice will be little
different from presuming them. The plaintiff will have to produce some
proof of his emotional injury-such as his own testimony that he felt humilia-
tion and mental anguish-but beyond that the jury surely will infer the
existence, nature, and extent of those injuries from the nature of the defama-
tory statement. Thus, emotional injuries, though not presumed, will be in-
ferred. Such an insignificant change in practice seems unlikely to reduce
substantially the amount of awards for emotional injuries. Anderson, supra
note 7, at 472.
See also Eaton, supra note 7, at 1437-39. Justice Brennan dissented in Firestone in part
because he believed that "by allowing this type of recovery the State has subverted what-
ever protective influence the 'actual injury' stricture may possess." 424 U.S. at 475 n.3
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
133. Cf. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 348-49 (1974); Anderson, supra
note 7, at 424.
134. See text accompanying note 98 supra.
135. Of course, it does not follow that so long as libel law performs the same
compensatory function as civil law generally it is necessarily legitimate in all
its various applications. The presence of First Amendment values means that
the State can be compelled to utilize finer, more discriminating instruments of
regulation where necessary to give more careful protection to these counter-
vailing interests. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 68-69 (1971)
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
136. See notes 129, 132 supra. Compare the experience of the law with "pure" mem-
tal injury, discussed in text accompanying notes 103-15 supra.
137. The court determines what injuries are compensable but the jury determines the
amount of damages recoverable for those injuries. Other than such limitations as the
use of the remittitur or the granting of a new trial, juries have very wide discretion in
making their determination. See generally C. MCCORMICK, supra note 129, at 24-28.
Limitations on the jury, however, are exercisable only to guard against excessive ver-
dicts "dictated by passion and prejudice." See F. HARPER & F. JAMEs § 5.29. Thus,
in practice these limitations are often ineffective. For example, in Rosenbloom, the
plaintiff, charitably characterized by the Court as a "distributor of nudist magazines,"
403 U.S. at 32, was initially granted a verdict of $750,000. Id. at 40. The trial court
reduced this sum on remittitur to $275,000, still a substantial sum. Id. Similarly, in
Butts the remittitur reduced an award of $3,060,000 to $460,000, 388 U.S. at 138, and
in Walker from $800,000 to $500,000, id. at 141-42 (punitive damages disallowed). Fur-
thermore, in many cases the court allows the verdict to stand without reduction. See,
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Similar problems with potentially excessive damages and trivial
claims are found in connection with the tort of infliction of emotional
distress, where the injuries are also purely mental. 138 A safeguard is
provided in emotional distress actions by the alternative requirements
that external physical symptoms of the mental disturbance be present
or that the defendant's conduct be "extremely outrageous."'139 The
law further requires that the conduct be intentional, both to supply
additional proof of the existence of injury and to promote the policy
of imposing greater responsibility on those who intend the harm they
bring about.140
Analogous safeguards would seem to be required in the privacy
area. Although it is apparently assumed in privacy cases that the pub.
licity itself is sufficient proof that damage has occurred,' 4' the danger
of imposture is no less when there has been publicity than when thera
has not, since the very fact of mental injury is still so difficult to de-
tect.142 The requirement that the tortious conduct be "highly offensive
to a reasonable person" offers little protection, because of the possibil-
ity that a "thick-skinned" plaintiff might recover for injuries he never
suffered. 143 In effect, then, the defendant's conduct is being punished
rather than the plaintiffs injury being compensated. The actual malice
standard propounded in Time, Inc. v. Hill would, however, guard
against trivial claims and excessive verdicts in much the same way as
do the physical injury and intent requirements in emotional distress
cases and the actual injury requirement in defamation cases.' 44 The
e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 256 (1964) ($500,000); Sprouse
v. Clay Communications, Inc., - W. Va. -, 211 S.E.2d 674, cert. denied, 423 U.S.
882 (1975) ($250,000). For differing views of the effect of Gertz on judicial limita-
tions of jury verdicts, compare Robertson, supra note 7, at 233-34, with Anderson, A Re-
sponse to Professor Robertson: The Issue Is Control of Press Power, 54 TEXAS L. REV.
271 (1976).
138. See text accompanying notes 103-09 supra.
139. See text accompanying notes 112-14supra.
140. "Intent" as defined by the Restatement indicates that the actor desires certain
consequences to follow or that he believes that the consequences are substantially certain
to follow from his actions. See RESTATEMENT § 8A. Where the defendant has in-
tended to do harm, "[m]ore liberal rules are applied as to the consequences for which he
will be held liable, the certainty of proof required, and the type of damage for which
recovery is to be permitted, as well as the measure of compensation." W. PROSSER § 7,
at 30. The reason for this liberality is the law's tendency to accord less weight to a de-
fendant's interests "when moral iniquity is thrown into the balance." Id. at 30-31.
141. See note 118 supra and accompanying text.
142. See note 118 supra and text accompanying notes 105-09 supra.
143. See generally Kalven, supra note 32, at 338-39.
144. The actual malice standard operates as a high threshold barrier to prevent the
suit from ever reaching the damages question. See Pember & Teeter, supra note 32, at
83-87. Thus, while the actual malice standard does not guarantee the fact of injury,
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inadequacies of an extended Gertz private plaintiff standard argue
strongly for retention of the actual malice test in all privacy actions.
B. Distinguishing Defamation and Privacy
Any attempt by the Supreme Court to distinguish privacy from
defamation must be predicated upon either the character of the words
used by the defendant or upon the nature of the injury sustained by
the plaintiff. By holding in Firestone that damages for mental injuries
alone may be recovered on a showing of negligence in a defamation
action brought by a non-public figure, the Court indicated that the lat-
ter distinction may no longer be valid.14 5 The Court had previously
lent affirmative support to a distinction based on the character of the
words when it stated in Gertz that the negligence standard is available
only where "the substance of the defamatory statement 'makes substan-
tial danger to reputation apparent.' "146 Conversely, no view was ex-
pressed as to the possible disposition of cases where a factual misstate-
ment "[does] not warn a reasonably prudent editor or broadcaster of
its defamatory potential."'1 47 If the Court were to rely on this distinc-
tion in the future, then non-defamatory false light privacy cases, and
defamation cases where extrinsic facts are necessary to make out the
defamatory meaning,14 would be judged against the actual malice
standard. All other privacy and defamation cases brought by private
figures would be governed by a lesser standard of liability.
From one point of view this distinction is appropriate, since the
apparent purpose of the Gertz opinion is to require some diligence
on the part of the media without inducing self-censorship.' 49 A defend-
ant who has warning of the defamatory potential of a statement might
be expect6d to take measures to ensure the accuracy of his report.
A defendant who has no warning, however, cannot reasonably be ex-
pected to take such precautions. To impose a penalty on the second
as perhaps these other safeguards do, it at least possesses the virtue of vastly reducing
the possibility of trivial claims and the danger of imposture.
145. See notes 60-62 supra and accompanying text.
146. 418 U.S. 323, 348 (1974).
147. Id.
148. Where extrinsic facts are necessary to make out the defamatory meaning, the
tort is denominated "libel per quod." See note 29 supra. The Restatement of Torts
views the Gertz Court's language as an indication that the standard of reasonableness
will govern the determination of whether a statement was defamatory on its face or not.
thereby eliminating the common law rule of strict liability in this situation, and perhaps
also, libel per quod. See RESTATEMENT § 580B, comment c at 28-29 (Tent. Draft No.
21, 1975).
149. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 348-49 (1974).
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defendant on proof of mere negligence might lead to excessive self-
censorship, since a publisher may often have little basis for assessing
the ultimate defamatory impact of a statement at the time of publica-
tion.5 0
While this approach achieves the obviously desirable goal of im-
posing greater liability on those who are most at fault, 5 ' it fails to
give adequate consideration to the problem of assessing damages. 152
Discussion in the previous section indicated that the principal difficulty
with eliminating the actual malice standard in the privacy area is that
neither the existence nor the extent of mental suffering can be proved
with sufficient precision to avoid trivial claims or excessive damages.' 53
It follows that damages for mental suffering cannot be adequately de-
termined in the absence of an underlying concrete injury even if the
statement is defamatory. Trivial claims might still be brought by dis-
sembling plaintiffs in the hope of persuading juries of the existence
of speculative mental injuries. Furthermore, it will be the rare case
where an excessive jury verdict will be overturned, or even reduced
to a sum which will not have a severe impact on free speech., 54 There-
fore, to permit recovery for such injuries on a showing of mere negli-
gence inadequately protects the media from jury "punishment" for
espousing unpopular opinions.
Additionally, in spite of the fact that this approach may follow
more readily from the literal terms of Gertz and Firestone,55 its adop-
150. A classic case of libel per quod involved a newspaper article which announced
the birth of twins to a certain woman in the community. Unfortunately, the woman
had only been married a month, and there were readers of the newspaper who were
aware of this fact. See Morrison v. Ritchie & Co., [19021 4 Fraser, Sess. Cas. 645,
39 Scot. L. Rep. 432, cited in W. PRossER § 112, at 763 n.30. Clearly, to allow recovery
in such a situation on a showing of mere negligence would lead to frequent instances
of self-censorship by the media.
151. The negligent defendant is held liable where the defamatory potential of the
statement is reasonably apparent, while the faultless defendant escapes liability alto-
gether. Furthermore, the defendant who acted recklessly or intentionally is held liable
even where the defamatory potential of the statement is not apparent. See note 51 su-
pra.
152. Gertz instituted the actual injury requirement to compensate defendants for their
loss of protection when a private plaintiff brings the suit. See 418 U.S. at 348-49. A
distinction based on the character of the words, therefore, must take into account the
nature of the injury to determine whether the actual injury requirement effectively
serves its purpose with respect to the particular injury; undue reliance on the standard
of fault requirement would defeat this compensating aspect of Gertz. In this regard,
it is pertinent to note that the discussion in Gertz of the character of the words came
prior to the discussion of the actual injury requirement. See id. at 348, 349-50.
153. See text accompanying notes 131-40 supra.
154. See note 137 supra.
155. See text accompanying notes 145-47 supra.
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tion would be fundamentally inconsistent with the logic of Gertz. The
suggested distinction between defamation and privacy focuses on the
character of the words used by the defendant rather than on the nature
of the injury suffered by plaintiff. The doctrine of presumed damages
also focused on the character of the words, since it was the "tendency"
of the words to injure reputation which gave rise to the presumption
of injury. Thus, the character of the words became significant only
as an aspect of the doctrine of presumed damages. Gertz, however,
expressly held that damages may no longer be presumed in this manner
and that proof of actual injury is required. 15 6 Elimination of that doc-
trine, therefore, appears to require a significant reduction in emphasis
upon the character of the words used, that is, the "tendency" aspect
of the definition, if injury to reputation is to remain the essence of
the tort.157
C. Proof of Harm to Reputation as a Prerequisite to Recovery for
Mental Suffering
Either of the first two approaches is readily reconcilable with the
language of the Firestone opinion, but each poses the threat of self-
censorship because of the difficulty of determining damages for
mental suffering when this injury is unaccompanied by harm to other
interests. The Court apparently failed to perceive the interrelationship
between presumed damages and the recognition of mental suffering
as a compensable injury. Courts have always viewed mental suffering
as an element of the damages presumed from the utterance of a de-
famatory falsehood rather than as a separate component of dam-
ages. 158 Because recovery for mental suffering was so integrally
related to the doctrine of presumed damages, the Court's abolishment
of that doctrine in Gertz should necessitate close examination of the
wisdom of permitting compensation solely for mental suffering in def-
amation actions.
A third approach, accordingly, would call for the Court to retreat
from Firestone and its implications and require that actual injury to
reputation be shown as a condition to recovery for mental injury in
defamation actions. Coupled with the Court's prior statement that the
negligence standard should be imposed only where the defamatory po-
tential of the statement is reasonably apparent,'5 9 the effect of this re-
156. See notes 53-57 supra and accompanying text.
157. "[D]amage to reputation is, of course, the essence of libel." Monitor Patriot
Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 275 (1971).
158. See note 31 supra and accompanying text.
159. 418 U.S. at 348.
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quirement would be that the lesser standard of fault is applicable only
in situations where the defamatory potential was reasonably apparent
and there had been actual harm to reputation. 160 In all other cases,
the plaintiff would be required to prove actual malice. Invocation of
the negligence standard on facts like those of Firestone would therefore
be precluded. This approach avoids the deficiency apparent in the
first two approaches-the difficulty of detecting and determining men-
tal injury which is unaccompanied by other tangible harm.
Since injury to reputation is susceptible of objective proof,16 it
can be determined with no greater difficulty than that encountered in
proving injuries in the physical torts. Where "pain and suffering" dam-
ages are assessed in the physical torts, the extent of physical damage
provides some guidance as to the extent of mental damage, since by
hypothesis there is some relationship between the two classes of in-
juries. 16 2 Similarly, in defamation the difficulties of valuing the extent
160. The last two situations discussed in the text can be illustrated graphically in the
following manner:
A. Distinction on the Basis of the Words:












Actual Malice [ Actual Malice
3. Harm to Reputation as Prerequisite to
Recovery for Mental Suffering:
Mental Injury Only Mental Injury and
Harm to Reputation
Actual Malice Negligence
Actual Malice Actual Malice
These charts demonstrate that the only difference in the standard of liability between
the two analyses is in the situation where the statement is apparently defamatory but
only mental injuries have resulted, as in the Firestone case. The reason for the higher
standard of liability in situation B is the essential inadequacy of the actual injury re-
quirement where only mental suffering has occurred. To maintain the high level of
protection which the actual injury requirement was intended to provide, a strict standard
of fault is necessary in this situation. See note 152 supra.
161. See note 85 supra and accompanying text.
162. Although "pain and suffering" damages are as difficult to assess as damages for
mental distress, see D. DoBns, HANDBOOK ON THE LAw OF REmEWES 544-45 (1973);
C. MCCORMICK, supra note 129, at 315-19, these damages are consequential to recovery
for the physical damage which is the basis for the action. Since they are consequential
damages, there is a relationship between the two injuries, and the determination of the
"reasonableness" of the award for mental suffering is limited by that relationship. See
generally RESTATEMENT § 905 (Tent. Draft No. 19, 1973).
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of mental injury are reduced because of the relationship between this
injury and injury to reputation. 163  A court would have ample grounds
for limiting recovery for mental injury if the recovery bore no reason-
able relationship to compensation for injury to reputation. As with
the physical torts, then, a negligence standard in such cases is not at
all inappropriate. 6
Furthermore, adoption of this approach would clarify matters by
emphasizing the theoretical distinctions between defamation and pri-
vacy. The mental injury a plaintiff suffers can arise either from injury
to his reputation or from the publicity given his private affairs. If
plaintiff proves that his reputation has in fact been injured, the clear
indication is that his mental suffering arose from damage to that inter-
est. In such a case, an action in defamation would be appropriate,
since reputation is the interest defamation is designed to protect.' s5
If plaintiff is unable to prove that his reputation has been injured, how-
ever, it would appear that his mental suffering must have arisen from
the publicity given the private facts rather than in response to the al-
tered conduct of third persons. Protection from public exposure of
private facts is the interest which privacy is designed to vindicate. 166
Since there has been no injury to reputation, the action should lie in
privacy.
Thus, a requirement that actual harm to reputation be shown as
a predicate to recovery for mental injuries protects the publisher from
the potentially large verdicts recoverable under a negligence standard.
If a private figure brings an action in defamation but is unable to prove
injury to reputation, then he should not be permitted to recover for
mental injuries unless it be shown that the publisher acted with actual
malice.
163. See notes 87-90 supra and accompanying text.
164. The law determines its standard of liability in particular types of cases by a bal-
ancing process. Thus, in intentional torts, defendant's conduct is thought to be so mor-
ally blameworthy that the law deems it appropriate that the defendant suffer fully for
the consequences of his act. Similarly, in cases of strict liability, defendant's conduct
is abnormally and inherently dangerous and he will be held liable for his activities even
without a showing of fault. See W. PRossEm § 75, at 494-96. In torts involving negli-
gence, however, the competing interests are more nearly in equilibrium, and a balance
is struck between the magnitude of the risk and the utility of the conduct. See RE-
STATEMENT §§ 291-93. See generally W. PRossER § 4. See also Wade, supra note 7,
at 3-5. When this analysis is applied in the context of privacy law, it seems apparent
that the utility of a defendant's conduct, that is, the unimpeded publication of matters
of public interest, far outweighs any right of plaintiff to his privacy, at least where the
only injury to plaintiff is indeterminate mental suffering and where the risk of self-cen-
sorship is therefore exceedingly high.
165. See note 66 supra and accompanying text.




The Supreme Court has labored for more than a decade to arrive
at a proper resolution of the conflict between the state interest in pro-
tection of an individual's reputation and the first amendment's protec-
tion of free speech. The Firestone case uncovered new difficulties
for the Court in the defamation area and raised the further question
of how the Court will dispose of a privacy case brought by a non-public
figure. Together, Gertz and Firestone suggest two possibilities: (1)
either the Gertz principles will be extended into the privacy area in
all privacy cases; or (2) a distinction will be made between those pri-
vacy cases in which the defamatory character of the falsehood is reason-
ably apparent on its face and those cases in which the defamatory char-
acter of the statement is not so reasonably apparent.
Unfortunately, both of these approaches fail to consider ade-
quately the difficulty of detecting or determining damages for mental suf-
fering. Gertz erected two media protections, a requirement of fault
on the part of the publisher and a requirement that actual damages
be pleaded and proved. Although these approaches comport with the
requirement of fault, they give inadequate weight to the actual injury
stricture, which is the primary safeguard against self-censorship.
An approach which establishes harm to reputation as a prerequi-
site to recovery for mental suffering in all defamation cases brought
by non-public figures does not suffer from this shortcoming. For this
reason, the use of such an approach appears to hold the most promise
for achieving a proper balance of the competing interests. It considers
both the degree of defendant's fault and the possibility of self-censor-
ship in those cases where the actual injury requirement cannot be effec-
tively met. Moreover, it is more theoretically compatible with the dif-
ferences between defamation and privacy. Because of these features,
this approach provides the most suitable framework for use by the
Court when a privacy action brought by a non-public figure comes be-
fore it.
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